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WHO CARES ABOUT COURTS? CREATING
A CONSTITUENCY FOR JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA
Mary L. Dudziak*
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW: FRANCIS NYALALI AND THE ROAD TO

By Jennifer A. Widner. New
Company, Inc. 2001. Pp. 454. Cloth, $29.95;

JUDICIAL I NDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA.

York: W.W. Norton
paper, $18.75.

&

While American scholars and judges generally assume that it is
beneficial to insulate courts from politics,1 Jennifer Widner2 offers
a contrasting perspective from another region of the world. In
Building the Rule of Law: Francis Nyalali and the Road to Judicial

Widner examines the role of courts and judi
cial review in democratization in Africa. She focuses on the role of one
judge, a man who would see himself as embodying a role in Tanzania
similar to that of Chief Justice John Marshall in the United States. 3
Francis Nyalali, Chief Justice of the High Court of Tanzania, worked
to carve out a role for courts in the politics of his nation. He focused
especially on the importance of public support for the courts, on judi
cial engagement with political culture, and on creating a constituency
for judicial review. Creating a public that cared about courts was, for
Nyalali, an essential component of democratic government.
Independence in Africa,

* Judge Edward J. and Ruey L. Guirado Professor of Law and History, University of
Southern California Law School. A.B. 1978, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1984,
M.A., M.Phil. 1986, Ph.D. 1992, Yale. For helpful comments, I am grateful to Chris Eisgru
ber, Howard Gillman, and Mark Kende. Thanks to Greg Barchie Rocio Herrera and Re
becca Lefler for helpful research assistance.

1. See generally Symposium, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 311 (1999); see also Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 112528 (1977).
2. Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan.
3. Francis Nyalali explicitly identified with American Supreme Court Justice John Mar
shall, and he drew from the American experience to make sense of his own role in Tanzania.
Nyalali and Marshall both were comparatively young when appointed to their positions.
Both faced the challenge of institution building, of crafting legal institutions and a culture
that would support a judiciary and judicial review. Pp. 34, 98-99, 139. On Chief Justice John
Marshall, see CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE RULE OF LAW (1996); R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE
OF THE SUPREME COURT (2002); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A
NATION (1996); G. EDWARD WHITE WITH GERALD GUNTHER, THE MARSHALL COURT
AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835 (1988).

1622

May 2003)

Judicial Independence in Africa

1623

Widner, an African politics scholar, focuses on the development of
the judiciary within common law Africa,4 especially Tanzania. Yet in
constructing this narrative, she writes from a perspective sensitive to
the ideas and assumptions held by U.S. scholars about American law
and legal institutions. As a result, she often frames points by placing
them within the context of ideas about the law prevalent in American
scholarship. What results is a narrative about Africa that opens up new
perspectives on legal institutions in general, including legal institutions
in the United States;
This Review first examines Widner's depiction of Nyalali's role in
Tanzania. It then turns to the questions of how this African example
can shed light on debates about courts in the United States and other
nations. In particular, this essay argues that the example of Nyalali
raises questions about the downsides of American assumptions about
virtues of judicial disengagement.
* * * * *

Widner provides an interior view on institutional development by
telling the story of courts in Africa through the professional life of
Chief Justice Francis Nyalali. What drives this narrative, however, is
not the complex texture of one individual's life, the conventional sub
ject of biography. It is a judicial biography of a different sort - a biog
raphy of the institution of the judiciary in a region of the world under
going institutional change. Nyalali served as chief justice of Tanzania's
highest court from 1976 to 2000, and he led the Tanzanian judiciary
through a crucial period of institution building. As Widner sees it,
"[h]is experiences provide a window for understanding the interaction
between judges, politicians, and publics throughout the African region
and the consequences for judicial independence and the rule of law"
(p. 38).
Widner sets this story within the context of the role of judicial
independence and the rule of law in other developing areas of
the world. In earlier years, she suggests, "many people in developing
countries either considered courts to be the agents of political leaders
or thought them frail, without the power of the sword or the power of
the purse behind them." By the end of the twentieth century, however,
"infringements of judicial independence . . . [generated] street protests
as well as foreign censure. The public relationship to the judiciary
appeared to have changed and with it, the institutional position of
courts and law" (p. 24).

4. Widner identifies common law Eastern and Southern Africa as the nations of
Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland, and Lesotho. P. 19.
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Was this idea of judging a Western value being awkwardly
imposed on Africa?5 In Nyalali's view, it was a universal democratic
value, and it was an African value. "[I]ndependence of the judiciary,
impartiality of adjudication, fairness of trial, and integrity of the
adjudicator are so universally accepted that one may reasonably
conclude that these principles are inherent to any justice system in a
democracy," he argued. "[T]here is no doubt that these same princi
ples are part of the African dream, resulting from the liberation
struggle against colonial and racial oppression. . . . They are inherent
to the statehood which came into being when our respective countries
became politically independent" (pp. 29-30; internal quotation marks
omitted).
A driving force of Nyalali's role as a judge was to carve out an
effective role for the courts in the life of his country. The challenges he
faced are illustrated by a political crisis that developed five years into
his tenure as Chief Justice. In the early 1980s, in the midst of an
economic and political crisis in Tanzania, the government cracked
down on corruption by passing an "Economic Sabotage Act" that not
only defined a class of economic. crimes, but placed their prosecution
outside the purview of the judiciary. Those accused of economic
sabotage were not entitled to bail or to legal representation. They
were to be tried before a ·tribunal that did not follow the rules of
evidence and procedure that governed the regular Tanzanian courts
(p. 144). How should the nation's highest judicial officer respond to
this challenge to judicial authority? "Suddenly I had to ask myself
whether I should continue as chief justice or resign," Nyalali later
recalled. "How. could I continue to preside over the courts when it was
declared a matter of policy to bypass the judiciary?" (p. 145).
The difficulty Nyalali faced is one that has confronted other judges
in other regimes. What should a judge do when she finds herself
presiding in a system that is itself unjust? Is it best to resign so as not
to confer legitimacy on an illegitimate system? Or is it better to stay
on, and to ameliorate the system's faults to the extent she can? Francis
Nyalali faced this question, but he did not choose between leaving or
staying. He chose instead a third path. He took his case to the political
process. In their efforts to fight corruption, he argued, Tanzanian
lawmakers were themselves being lawless. In a speech before the
National Executive Committee of Tanzania's state party, Nyalali
insisted that "no one however high or low is above the law" (p. 151).
Although criticized by some as a "stooge of imperialism," Nyalali
gained the support of President Julius Nyerere, and ultimately the
legislature passed a resolution supporting the rule of law (pp. 150-51).
5. For an argument that current democratization efforts in Africa are based on ideas
about the state that stem from a Western capitalist world view, not from African traditions,
see CLAUDE AKE, THE FEASIBILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (2000).
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Through this story Widner illuminates the role of judges as strategic
political actors. And the focus of strategic politics in this story is the
courts themselves. Nyalali acted politically to generate a constituency
for judicial review.
Reform was not a matter of gradual evolution. Instead, Nyalali had
to capitalize on moments when change could be accomplished. Some
times there were "openings" when institution building was possible. 6
One such moment for Tanzania was the crisis precipitated by the
Economic Sabotage Act. In that context, several matters converged,
creating an opportunity for judges to "renegotiate the relationship
between branches and engage in institution building" (p. 151). There
was an economic crisis, coupled with pressure for reform from foreign
aid agencies. This coincided with concerns about loss of control on the
part of political leaders, and with the President's impending retirement
and his concern with the image of his leadership. This confluence of
factors, Widner argues, created an "opening," but whether the
opportunity would lead to meaningful reform depended on Nyalali
and his judicial colleagues (p. 151). "Openings" in other nations would
not always be taken advantage of, and when there was no crisis, no
"opening," there was also no institution building.
When moments of crisis created an opening conducive to change,
what factors influenced whether reform took place? Widner makes the
interesting argument that the "capacity to use this new political space
to build stronger judicial institutions was intricately bound up in the
character of substantive law" (p. 155). Her focus is on the role of
public opinion in judicial institution building, and on the way substan
tive legal developments helped create a constituency, or a culture,
supportive of judicial review. According to Widner:
Courts could function effectively and independently, but still fail to win
the public affection that is important as a long-term protection against
encroachment. ... The content or substance of the Jaw, as well as the in
terpretive strategies judges employed in their work, could enhance or
impede �he bid to invigorate the separation of powers. (p. 155)

The crisis that created an opening for a politics in support of a rule of
law, Widner argues, led to new support for individual rights.
While bills of rights were adopted in many African countries at
independence, the Tanzanian independence constitution had none.
Yet in the years before foreign donors promoted rights as conducive to
economic development, Widner argues that a "home grown"
interest in rights developed in Tanzania. A combination of interna
tional developments within Africa and domestic politics Jed to the
creation of a Tanzanian Bill of Rights and Duties. Adopted as an
6. For an elaboration of this idea in the American context, see generally BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991), and BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
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amendment to the Tanzanian Constitution in 1984, the Bill of Rights
and Duties protected equality rights, and rights to "life; freedom from
torture and inhumane or degrading treatment; to the presumption
of innocence; to a fair hearing by a court of law or other body; to
freedom of speech, religion, and association," among others (p. 169).
The rights were subject to limitations. For example, rights were not to
be exercised "in such a manner as to occasion the infringement or
termination of the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest"
(p. 169). The juxtaposition of rights and limitations meant that the
actual scope of enforceable rights would depend on the courts. The
amendment also outlined duties of the individual to society: the
duty to work, the duty to abide by law, the duty to safeguard public
property, and the duty "to defend, protect and promote national
independence" (p. 170). These new provisions were subject to a three
year grace period to enable lawmakers to modify statutes if needed
before the new rights went into effect.
How would the new Bill of Rights and Duties affect judicial
independence in Tanzania? Some judges hoped to capitalize on this
development. They believed that cases enforcing individual rights
would strengthen the courts' independence from other branches and
would enhance the courts' legitimacy. Others felt that individual rights
enforcement by the courts would place the courts in conflict with the
legislative and executive branches, ultimately undermining judicial
independence. In a speech before the law faculty of the University
of Dar es Salaam, Nyalali addressed the concern that judicial inde
pendence would be impaired. He tried to put down the "doubts and
darkness" that gripped the legal profession after the constitutio.nal
amendment had passed (p. 173; internal quotation marks omitted). He
also spoke to the question of whether the limitations clauses would
undermine the effectiveness of the nation's new rights. Drawing from
constitutional case law in India, Nyalali argued that limitations clauses
must be read in a way that did not derogate individual rights.
"Together, not individually," such principles "form the core of the
constitution," he argued. "Together, not individually, they constitute
its true conscience." In interpreting constitutional rights and duties,
"the spirit of the constitution is made to speak loudly and clearly in the
provisions" (p. 175).
Nyalali's sense of the nature of the "spirit of the constitution"
would become clear as the court took up the question of the nature of
constitutional interpretation. According to Widner, a need to gain
public acceptance to enhance judicial legitimacy affected strategies of
interpretation. Widner describes the beginnings in the mid-1980s and
'90s of "a new jurisprudence that took account of the sharp divisions
of opinion that existed in [the] country and allowed the court to build
institutional legitimacy" (p. 179). As Justice Nyalali put it, "If the law
is to have roots in the hearts and minds of the people of our own
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country, we must articulate it upon principles which have been tested
or enunciated in our own history" (p. 181; internal quotation marks
omitted).
To inform his interpretation of the Bill of Rights and Duties with
Tanzanian history, Nyalali turned to the writings of nationalists from
the independence era. The values underlying the Tanzanian constitu
tional order were not new, Nyalali argued. "These principles and
values were articulated on African soil by the great leaders of modern
Africa" (p. 181). In turning to the past, Nyalali did not invoke the
narrow conceptions of history that sometimes inform constitutional
interpretation, such as the idea of the "intent of the framers."7 Instead,
Nyalali looked more broadly to Tanzanian political culture at the time
the new nation, and its legal institutions, were created. The values that
informed Tanzanian constitutionalism, he argued, "are the principles
and values which underlay the African liberation struggle and gave
birth to our nationhood" (p. 181). Moreover, the history of Tanzania,
Nyalali argued, "is a history of the internalization of the principles and
values of a world-wide liberation movement" (p. 183).
In later years, through his efforts to engage the public, Nyalali
would find himself even more fully at the center of Tanzanian
politics. At one moment, his role in Tanzania came perilously close to
obliterating the separation of powers he had so diligently championed.
Tanzania had a one-party government until the early 1990s. In 1991,
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi assembled a commission to consider
changing to a multiparty system. In need of a respected person to chair
this important commission, the president turned to Nyalali. This
placed the Chief Justice in a difficult position. Nyalali supported the
move to a multiparty system, but worried that serving on the commis
sion could undermine the independence of the judiciary. He ultimately
served on the commission, which recommended that the country move
to political pluralism. Three years later, Tanzania had its first multi
party election. Nyalali found himself in an even more awkward
position when the major parties· approached him about running for
president. However, as Widner sees it, Nyalali's ambition was not for
power per se, but for judicial power; his ambition was not for judicial
supremacy, but instead for the authority that would facilitate judicial
independence. He declined the call to stand for election.
The struggle for a multiparty system ultimately enhanced the role
of the judiciary in Tanzania. Here, again, Widner stresses the impor7. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SE
DUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (1988). See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTI
TUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1999); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).

1628

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.

101:1622

tance of public opinion in creating a political culture within which an
independent judiciary might flourish. Following Tanzania's multiparty
elections, the courts had the responsibility of hearing petitions about
election disputes. Hearings on the petitions attracted so much public
interest that, according to Nyalali, "[i]n some places, we had to set up
loudspeakers outside the courtroom, in trees, because there was not
enough space in the courtrooms for all the people who wanted to
attend" (p. 310). The court, Widner concluded, "had become a center
for deliberation and public education about democratic norms. It had
also found a new set of constituents in the men and women who
sought to run for office on fair terms" (p. 310). While judicial
independence is often seen as a measure of democratization in Africa,8
Widner helps us to see that courts are themselves sites for democrati
zation. Courts themselves can enhance the development of a demo
cratic political culture. In this sense, the judiciary is not only reflective
of democracy, but constitutive of it.
In developing a constituency for courts in Africa, the substantive
area of law that Widner finds to be of most importance is family law.
"Some day," she suggests, "judges and lawyers might look back on the
end of the twentieth century and say that the cases that had contrib
uted most to law development in this period were not those that
concerned political liberties but those that were about gender and
family" (p. 335). Nyalali hoped that women especially "would turn to
the courts for help in resolving conflicts" (p. 335). According to
Widner, he believed that "there was no better way to draw African
principles into the common law and to begin to build an understanding
of constitutional norms than to support judicial development of family
law" (p. 335).
The importance of family law in Africa stems in part from high
rates of urbanization, which did not sever kinship relationships, but
complicated them. Mortality from AIDS and civil conflict also
"scrambled the conventional division of labor, as well as norms
governing succession and inheritance. Yet women's participation in
the family, community, and economy was often restricted in ways that
impeded adaptation to changed new circumstances" (p. 336). When
African women went to court, they "appealed to principles in the
common law or to the antidiscrimination clauses in new constitutions
and international covenants" (p. 338). Their cases presented a
challenge for courts, as most African constitutions both forbade

8. See, e.g., Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysl�. 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (1996); Jennifer Widner,
Courts and Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social Scientist's Perspective on the
African Case, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 64 (2001). For a critique of current democratization efforts,

see AKE, supra note 5.
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discrimination against women and mandated respect for customary
law, which restricted women's role.
While Widner effectively ·makes the case for the importance of
gender to the clash between customary and constitutional law, this is
sue does not fit neatly within the focus of her narrative: Nyalali's
experience as a window into the development of judicial independ
ence. Her most illuminating examples come not from Tanzania, but
from Botswana and Zimbabwe. This underscores an awkward feature
of Widner's use of one person's story when at times she wishes to
illuminate judicial development in a region. In the Tanzanian family
law case, the court ruled in favor of an appellant who argued that
a woman's attempt to sell property violated customary law that
disallowed women from disposing of clan property. In rejecting the
woman's constitutional arguments, Nyalali's opinion noted that the
new Bill of Rights did not yet apply to such claims, since the three
year grace period had not yet lapsed. His opinion emphasized,
however, that the court had ruled previously that customary law had
no exceptional status, so that claims like the one at issue might be
heard in the future. So although he did not take up the substantive
issue of sex discrimination in this case, he did make it clear that
customary law would be subject to constitutional review (pp. 359-60).
* * * * *

Can a book on courts in Africa inform legal scholarship in
America? In recent years, as law schools have taken up the question of
the impact of globalization on the practice of law, interest in the law
and the courts in other nations has increased. The traditional focus
of comparative law in the United States has been on comparing
American law with the law of European nations. 9 Recent scholarship
has encompassed more of the globe, and important work has focused
10

9. Some doubt that comparative Jaw has significant value unless the systems being com
pared have certain cultural similarities. See Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court 2001 Term Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 16, 113 (2002) ("[I]nterpretive inspiration is only proper if there is an ideological basis
common to the two legal systems and a common allegiance to basic democratic principles.");
P. G. Monateri, "Everybody's Talking": The Future of Comparative Law, 21 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 825, 826 (1998) ("Culture (and the differences between them) has always
been a central concern of comparative law, and the first step of the conventional approach is
to divide the legal world into families by tracing back common roots, as genealogies to ex
plain the present. Genealogies define who we think we are or would like to think we are.
They define an 'us' and a 'them,' and they are an essential mechanism of how identities are
constructed."). Additionally, "(f]or the past half century, comparative law in the United
States has been led by the generation of emigres who fled Hitler's Europe to become profes
sors of comparative Jaw," which has influenced the focus of comparative legal scholarship.
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Compara
tive Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 43-44 (1998).
10. See, e.g., Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race Ideology in
the Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Laws, a United States-Latin America Comparison, 87
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on South Africa. 11What of the rest of the continent of Africa? Amidst
the blossoming of comparative scholarship, most of the continent
of Africa is usually overlooked, as if it were a legal "Heart of
Darkness," 12 as if it were a lawless world. How could such a world
offer lessons for our own? Although there was a flurry of interest
during the independence years, Africa has remained largely off the
agenda of American legal scholarship.13
American lawyers embraced Africa in the 1960s. Before the
current generation of American legal scholars who have advised other
nations about constitutional development, American lawyers went to
Africa to counsel nations emerging from colonialism about constitu
tions, courts, and legal education.14 A number of American law
CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2002); Kwang-Rok Kim, The Tender Offer in Korea: An Analytic
Comparison Between Korea and the United States, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 497 (2001);
Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies:
Lessons from the Prewar Japanese Cotton Textile Industry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 171 (2000);
Chester S. Spell, The Evolution of Rights Disputes and Grievance Procedures: A Comparison
of New Zealand and The U.S., 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 199 (1997); Craig P. Wagnild, Civil Law
Discovery in Japan: A Comparison of Japanese and U.S. Methods of Evidence Collection in
Civil Litigation, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. l (2002).
11. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST APARTHEID, 1980-1994 (1995); KENNETH S. BROUN, BLACK LAWYERS, WHITE
COURTS: THE SOUL OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW (2000); STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF
TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY (1992); HEINZ
KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM, AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL
RECONSTRUCTION (2000). An important focus of comparative work has been on race rela
tions in the U.S. and South Africa. See JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE
SUPREMACY: THE ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AMERICAN
SOUTH (1982); GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981); see also Mark s. Kende, Gender
Stereotypes in South African and American Constitutional Law: The Advantages of a Prag
matic Approach to Equality and Transformation, 117 S. AFR. L.J. 745 (2000).
12. See JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS (1902); see also BILL BERKELEY, THE
GRAVES ARE NOT YET FULL: RACE, TRIBE, AND POWER IN THE HEART OF AFRICA 7
(2001) (criticizing "the conventional American conception of Africa as a unitary landscape
of unremitting despair").
13. There are, of course, exceptions to this trend. See, e.g., Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy
E. Higgins, Promise Unfulfilled: Law, Culture, and Women's Inheritance Rights in Ghana, 25
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (2001); James Thuo Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms: Ex
panding the Promises and Possibilities of the Rule of Law as an Anti-Corruption Strategy in
Kenya, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 407 (1999); Minasse Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its
Impact Upon Unity, Human Rights, and Development, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1
(1996); Richard A. Rosen, Constitutional Process, Constitutionalism, and the Eritrean Experi
ence, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 263 (1999); Annmarie M. Terraciano, Contesting
Land, Contesting Laws: Tenure Reform and Ethnic Conflict in Niger, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 723 (1998); Adrien Katherine Wing, Communitarianism v. Individualism: Constitu
tionalism in Namibia & South Africa, 11 WIS. INT'L L.J. 295 (1993).
14. Aspects of this story will be explored in KEVIN GAINES, FROM BLACK POWER TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPATRIATES IN NKRUMAH'S GHANA, 1957-1966
(forthcoming); and Mary L. Dudziak, Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood Marshall and
the Constitution of Kenya (Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See
also PAUL L. EDENFIELD, THE AMERICAN HEARTBREAK: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF
PAULI MURRAY (Robert Crown Law Library, Stanford Law School, Women's Legal History
Biography Project, Autumn 2002), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/WLHP/
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teachers taught law in Africa. 15 Because there were very few indige
nous African lawyers in most nations immediately after independence,
building a legal profession in African countries was an aspect of nation
building.
One of the many contributions of Widner's very rich book is that
she traces the history of the engagement of American lawyers and
legal academics with Africa, from the earlier "law and development"
movement, through its demise, and to the current involvement of
American lawyers and scholars in Africa. During the independence
era, foundations and government agencies supported the development
of legal institutions and education in Africa. Idealistic Americans went
to Africa to aid new African governments. This movement was short
lived, however, as law came to be seen in Africa as a neocolonial in
strument. Law was thought to "serve the interests of state authorities
and social engineers. It had lost its status as a source of norms that
could help define appropriate limits on the use of political power."16
Law reform would be back on the agenda of international aid agencies
by the 1990s, "responding to the 'pull' of African judges like Nyalali
and the 'push' of their own policy makers" (p. 207). Law reform was
now thought to aid democratization and to create a better climate for
economic growth.
The issue at the heart of this study, the idea of judges as strategic
political actors, is both familiar to scholars in the United States, and
for some, an anathema. 17 However, the picture of judges and politics
papers/paulimurray.pdf. On connections between the U.S. civil rights movement and African
nationalists, see JAMES H. MERIWETHER, PROUDLY WE SHALL BE AFRICANS: BLACK
AMERICANS AND AFRICA, 1935-1961 (2000); YEVETTE RICHARDS, MAIDA SPRINGER:
PAN-AFRICANIST AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR LEADER (2002); PENNY M. VON ESCHEN,
RACE AGAINST EMPIRE: BLACK AMERICANS AND ANTICOLONIALISM, 1937-1957 (1997).
15. Pp. 52-53, ZOO; see James C. N. Paul, American Law Teachers in Africa: Some His
torical Observations, 31 J. AFR. L. 18 (1987).
16. P. 203. For an important contemporaneous critique of the law and development
movement, see David M. Trubec & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 4 WIS. L. REV.
1062 (1974).
17. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); WALTER
F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964). On courts and electoral politics in
the United States, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Howard Gillman, How Political
Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States,
1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511 (2002); and Mark A. Graber, The Non-Majoritarian
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993). See also
TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999). On recent "partisan
entrenchment" in Supreme Court politics, see Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Under
standing the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001). On judicial review and
democratic politics, see generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). On post-World War II scholarship
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Courts, The Constitution, and Constitutional Politics Since 1945, in A COMPANION TO POST1945 AMERICA (Jean-Christophe Agnew & Roy Rosensweig eds., 2002); Barry E. Friedman,
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that emerges from scholarship on United States courts is different
from the sort of intersection between courts and politics in Widner's
book. For example, following the 2000 election, scholars debated
whether the United States Supreme Court had been partisan in its
decision in Bush v. Gore.18 More frequently, the Court is seen as
supporting the interests of particular social classes,19 or as championing
a liberal or conservative ideology. 2 0 Judicial politics is discussed in
terms of the substantive values judges support.
The fictional character Mr. Dooley famously said that "th' supreme
court follows th' illiction returns,''21 and scholars often argue that the
United States Supreme Court is careful not to move too far beyond
public opinion, lest it damage its legitimacy. 2 2 In this sense, public
opinion is seen as a boundary constraining the scope of judicial action.
This conception of political culture as a boundary is different, and
more limited, than Nyalali's proactive engagement.
The notion of courts reaching out to the public runs directly
contrary to some American perspectives on the judicial role. Most
prominently, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has decried the
idea that courts should have regard for public opinion, suggesting that
it is important for the Supreme Court to ignore it. He has said: "I don't
know what the most profoundly held beliefs of the American people
The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
18. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: How
THE COURT DECIDED THE 2000 ELECJ'ION (2001); RICHARD A POSNER, BREAKING THE
DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); JEFFREY
TOOBJN, TOO CLOSE TO CALL: THE THIRTY-SIX DAY BATTLE TO DECIDE THE 2000
ELECTION (2001); THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass A. Sunstein
& Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).
19. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (James Boyle ed., 1992); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995);

POLITICS, POSTMODERNITY, AND CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: THE LEGALITY OF THE
CONTINGENT (Costas Douzinas et al. eds., 1994).
20. See, e.g., STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, MORALITY IMPOSED: THE REHNQUIST COURT
AND LIBERTY JN AMERICA (2000); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ISSUE (1998); LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT
AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); TINSLEY E.
YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (2000); THE BURGER
COURT: THE COUNTER REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1986); THE
BURGER COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION? (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1998); THE WARREN COURT JN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (Mark v.
Tushnet ed., 1993).
21. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901).
22. See Barry E. Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four:
Law's Politics 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1058-59 (2000) [hereinafter Friedman, The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four]; see also BICKEL, supra note 17, at 127-29;

JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 48 (1980).
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are. I don't go to the neighborhood pub and raise a glass with Joe Six
pack. "23 When the United States Supreme Court considered abortion
rights in the 1989 case Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, Scalia suggested that the Court should not be "the object of
the sort of organized public pressure that political institutions in a
democracy ought to receive." 2 4 Scalia reiterated his concern about
public engagement with the Court in another abortion case, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey in 1992. "How upsetting it is," he complained,
"that so many of our citizens (good people, not lawless ones, on both
sides of the abortion issue, and on various of other issues as well) think
that we Justices should properly take into account their views, as
though we were engaged not in ascertaining an objective law but in
determining some kind of social consensus." 2 5 This argument for
disengagement is consistent with Scalia's theory of law and interpreta
tion. 2 6 Because, for Scalia, law stands apart from culture, rather than
being constructed by it, the rule of law depends upon insulation rather
than engagement. In contrast, for Nyalali, a rule of law requires judi
cial engagement with political culture. Engagement does not under
mine the rule of law, but enhances it by fostering a culture supportive
of judicial review. In this sense, Nyalali sees law and culture as
mutually constitutive,27 while Scalia views them as separate spheres
that must not commingle. In this way, Building a Rule of Law helps us
to broaden our conception of the relationship between courts and poli
tics. It also helps us to take seriously the question of whether the Joe
and Jane "Six-packs" of the world should be very much on the agenda
of courts interested in maintaining their own legitimacy.
·

* * * * *

Jennifer Widner's fascinating study of courts and politics in Africa
helps us reflect on courts and politics in the United States. As the
United States Supreme Court has undergone an ideological shift to the
right in the late twentieth century, affecting the nature of individual
rights and the scope of congressional power, some scholars have ar
gued for a turn away from the courts. They advocate "populist
constitutionalism," or an emphasis on the constitution outside the

23. Obiter Dicta; So They Say, A.B.A. J., June 1996, at 16.
24. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999-1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 41, 43, 44-45 (1997).
27. On the idea of law and culture as mutually constitutive, see Robert W. Gordon,
Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63-65, 123-24 (1984).
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courts. 28 While this scholarly move is a helpful corrective in its empha
sis that the judiciary is not the only locus of constitutional analysis, it
may also deflect political debate from a focus on the role of the judici
ary itself. If courts are constitutive of popular democracy, rather than
simply a reflection of it, then even populists must engage the courts
since the courts play a role in constructing political culture.
At this moment in the history of American courts, it may be
helpful to reflect on the lesson Widner offers about Tanzania. In a
democracy, judicial legitimacy and authority ultimately flow from a
public, from a culture, supportive of judicial review. 29 And as we can
see in this example from Africa, support for the courts can depend on
the very nature of judicial action. The courts and the people together
worked to build a rule of law in Tanzania premised on the idea that
the courts play a central role in a democracy: the protection of indi
vidual rights against government tyranny.
In this sense, perhaps, Francis Nyalali also has a lesson for popular
constitutionalism. He emphasizes a public conception, a political
culture, not just on the nature of rights, but also on the role of courts
in a democracy. And so, paradoxically, the popular constitutionalism
we see in Building the Rule of Law is not only a popular constitutional
vision about rights. It is also a popular vision of the importance of
courts. How interesting that as African nations embrace judicial
review, there is less consensus among American scholars that it
matters to care about courts.

28. See, e.g., RICHARD PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL
POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS (1999); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term - Foreword:
We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REY. 4 (2001); see also Barry E. Friedman, Mediated Popular
Comtitlllionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
29. For an analysis of this idea in the American context, see Friedman, The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four, supra note 22.

